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Casenote
VACATING ARBITRATORS' AWARDS UNDER THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: ARE COURTS SECOND-GUESSING ARBITRATORS'
DECISIONS?
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the use of collective bargaining agreements, management
and labor contract for "justice" from an arbitrator in settling labor dis-
putes.I In these agreements, both parties waive the right to have a court
resolve matters that fall within the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
2
1. See Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 57 n.l (1987). A collective bargaining
agreement generally sets forth the terms of employment such as wages, hours
and benefits. Id. When a dispute arises over the terms of the agreement, an
employee will file a grievance with the employer. Id. The employee and em-
ployer will then attempt to resolve the matter independently. Id. If this effort
fails, union representatives will intervene in the matter. Id. Finally, if both of
these efforts at dispute resolution fail, the union may demand that the matter be
submitted to arbitration. Id. At the arbitration stage, the arbitrator, who is
selected by both parties, conducts a hearing and reaches a decision on the mat-
ter. Id. Virtually all collective bargaining agreements provide that the arbitra-
tor's decision on the matter is "final and binding." Id. (noting that
approximately 96% of collective bargaining agreements provide for binding
arbitration).
The arbitrator's award is often termed "justice" or "industrial justice." See,
e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200,
1206 (9th Cir. 1989) (plurality opinion) (en banc) ("The labor arbitrator's
award, often termed the rendering of 'industrial justice,' is simply a manifesta-
tion of the parties' obligations under their contract."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946
(1990); see also Jesse P. Schaudies, Jr. & Christopher S. Miller, The Critical Role of a
Judicially Recognized Public Policy Against Illegal Drug Use in the Workplace, 12 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 153, 159 (1991) ("Arbitration was designed to give life to collective
bargaining agreements, to ensure procedural due process for individual employ-
ees, and to resolve conflicts peacefully through an independent third party
rather than through strikes or work stoppages."); Joseph F. Tremiti, Misco and
the Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Awards: No Longer a House Divided?, 14 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 279, 279 (1989) ("It is a well-established principle of American la-
bor law that the grievance-arbitration process is the chief vehicle for resolving
disputes arising from a collective bargaining agreement. In large measure, the
collective bargaining agreement establishes the relationship between the em-
ployer and the employees and among the employees themselves." (footnote
omitted)). For a general discussion of arbitration principles and procedures, see
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed.
1985).
2. See Edgar A. Jones, Jr., "His Own Brand of Industrial Justice' " The Stalking
Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REv. 881, 893 (1983)
("Whatever the content or import of the challenged award .... the brand of
(1051)
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Therefore, courts generally will not review the merits of an arbitration
award unless the disputed issue falls outside the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement. 3 Instead, courts will defer to the arbitrator's de-
cision. 4 This deference reflects the courts' recognition and appreciation
industrial justice dispensed in that award is the precise brand the party assessed
and agreed to purchase, eyes open, for better or for worse, for richer or for
poorer."); see also Thomas J. McDermott, Arbitrability: The Court Versus the Arbitra-
tor, 23 ARB. J. 18, 19 (1968) ("The uniqueness enjoyed by arbitration as a system
of industrial jurisprudence is that it is the creature of the parties. It is created by
them, and its limits, rules and regulations are established and may be changed
by them."); TheodoreJ. St. Antoine,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1977) ("[The arbitrator] is speaking for the parties, and his [or her] award is
their contract... [and] should be treated as though it were a written stipulation
by the parties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor
contract.").
3. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960). In United Steelworkers, the United States Supreme Court
noted that:
The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be
undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards....
It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as
the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the
courts have no business overruling him [or her] because their interpre-
tation of the contract is different from his [or hers].
Id. at 596, 599; see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 36 (1987) ("[T]he courts play only a limited role when asked to review the
decision of an arbitrator."); Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978)
(stating that judicial review of labor arbitration awards is "among the narrowest
known to the law").
4. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Transportation Comm.
Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Our decision in this case rests
upon a reluctance to undercut a process whose importance to labor-manage-
ment relations has been reaffirmed repeatedly by Congress and the courts.");
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1206, 1209 ("Deference is premised on the simple no-
tion that courts do not free the individual from his [or her] obligations merely
because those obligations turned sour on him [or her] .... Deference is the rule;
rare indeed is the exception."); Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752,
755 (3d Cir.) ("[C]ourts should not disturb ambiguous, unclear, and even delib-
erately opaque arbitration opinions because 'the policy in favor of the peaceful
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration outweighs any damage which
arbitration might cause.' " (quoting Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 195 v.
Cross Brothers Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3d Cir. 1975))), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
One legal commentator has suggested that "one of the strongest reasons
why courts should defer to the contractual findings of labor arbitrators is that
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement can limit the arbitrator's author-
ity." Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1988). Additionally,Judge Posner has
stressed the efficiency and quickness of arbitration, arguing that "[t]he most im-
portant reason for deference to labor arbitrators is that labor disputes ought to
be resolved rapidly; and, to be fast, arbitration must be final." Jones Dairy Farm
v. Local P-1236, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 755 F.2d 583,
586 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated, 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 845 (1985).
1052
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of two important factors: the parties' expressed intent to have arbitra-
tors, and not courts, interpret their agreements in accordance with in-
dustry practices, 5 and a statutory preference for having parties settle
5. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38. In Misco, the Supreme Court noted that:
[b]ecause the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an ar-
bitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's
view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing deci-
sions of lower courts.
Id.; see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ("The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confi-
dence in his [or her] knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in
his [or her] personal judgment .... The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance .... ); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir.) (stating that if broad judicial review of arbi-
trators' awards were allowed, "the Congressional objective of settling labor
disputes by arbitrators expert in industrial practices and customs would be un-
dermined" (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960))), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); Stead Motors,
886 F.2d at 1206-09 (stating that because courts are unfamiliar with practices of
shop, they are in no position to second-guess arbitrator's decision).
Commentators have also noted that parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment select arbitrators based on their knowledge of the shop. Joseph H.
Bornong, Judicial Review By Sense of Smell: Practical Application of the Steelworkers
Essence Test in Labor Arbitration Appeals, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 643, 658 (1988). Pro-
fessor Bornong has commented:
[Arbitration] trades off some impartiality by seeking decision makers
versed in the "common law of the shop," who are experts in the field,
rather than seeking the judicial model of the generalist who is to learn
everything he [or she] will know about the parties, their surroundings,
and their problems from the record adduced at trial.
Id. (quoting Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council
Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 376 ("[A]rbitrators on the whole are capable of dealing
with statutes and other external law bearing upon problems the parties have
brought to the arbitrator."); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Pan-
acea or Anathema, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 680 (1986) ("The recent experience of
labor arbitrators in the federal sector, who are required to police compliance
with laws, rules, and regulations, suggests that the interpretation and application
of law may not lie outside the competence of arbitrators."); Ann C. Hodges, The
Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 635-36 (1990)
(noting that private arbitrators are "chosen because of their knowledge of the
industrial common law and they are expected to rely on that knowledge in issu-
ing a decision"); Ray, supra note 4, at 2 ("Labor arbitrators, unlike judges, are
selected by the parties themselves. They deal with, and are presumed to be ex-
pert in, the narrow range of issues involved in interpreting labor contracts.").
But cf PAUL R. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEw 37-38 (1966)
(concluding that arbitrators do not have experience and knowledge of industrial
relations with which Supreme Court credits them (citing United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))); Edward Brunet,
Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 88 (1992) ("Arbitrators
are often said to be experts in the subject matter of the disputes they adjudi-
cate .... The growth of private arbitration, however, has produced such a de-
mand for experts that there is reason to doubt modern arbitration expertise.").
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labor disputes without government intervention. 6
While this deferential review of collective bargaining agreements
gives courts a very limited power over arbitrators' decisions, exceptional
circumstances do exist in which judicial review of an arbitrator's deci-
sion is proper. 7 One such circumstance occurs when the arbitrator's
6. See Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988). The
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides, in pertinent part:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is de-
clared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement.
Id.; see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 37 ("The reasons for insulating arbitral decisions
from judicial review are grounded in the federal statutes regulating labor-man-
agement relations. These statutes reflect a decided preference for private settle-
ment of labor disputes without the intervention of government ...."); Gulf
Coast Indus. Work Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1993) (stat-
ing that "Congress's decided preference for arbitration, as reflected in federal
statutes regulating labor-management relations, establishes a standard of review
that is highly deferential to the arbitrator's bargained-for judgment"); Bet-
tencourt v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that
limited scope of review "serves [the] legislative policy that '[flinal adjustment by
a method agreed upon by the parties is ... the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement' " (alteration in original) (quoting Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1988))); DeannaJ. Mouser, Analysis of
the Public Policy Exception after Paperworkers v. Misco: A Proposal to Limit the Public
Policy Exception and to Allow the Parties to Submit the Public Policy Question to the Arbitra-
tor, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 89, 95 (1990) (stating that allowing courts to redetermine
merits of case would undermine federal policy of promoting arbitration); see
also Clyde W. Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the
Looking Glass, 2 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 27 (1953) (stating that "courts have a function
[in reviewing arbitration awards], but it is the limited one of exercising only
enough supervision to prevent labor arbitration from destroying itself').
7. See Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 248 (stating while courts should defer to arbi-
trators' decisions, "arbitration awards are not inviolate"). A court may review
an arbitrator's award de novo if: (1) there is evidence of fraud or partiality; (2) the
award violates a law; (3) the award is too ambiguous to be enforced; or (4) the
award contravenes public policy. Arco-Polymers, 671 F.2d at 754 n.1 (citing Lud-
wig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1,128-29 n.27 (3d
Cir. 1969)); see also C. Val Morley, Note, The Incredible Expanding Public Policy Ex-
ception to Arbitration Finality, 21 WILLAME-rrE L. REV. 631, 634 (1985) (explaining
when courts can overturn arbitrators' awards).
The exception for fraud or partiality is well-established, grounded in both
common law and statute. See CharlesJ. Morris, Twenty Years of Tilogy: A Celebra-
tion, 33 NAT'L ACAD. ARBS. 331, 336 (1981) ("At common law, an award was
unenforceable . . .for fraud, partiality, and misconduct . ); Alan H. Roth-
stein, Vacation of Awards for Fraud, Bias, Misconduct and Partiality, 10 VAND. L. REv.
813, 816-22 (1957) (providing examples of arbitrator conduct that rises to level
of fraud, bias, partiality or misconduct); see also United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). Pursuant to § 10 of the United States Arbitration Act, a
court may vacate an arbitration award:
(I) Where the award was procurred by corruption, fraud or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
1054
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award contravenes public policy. 8 The public policy exception reflects
the view that arbitrators' decisions are bargained-forjustice. 9 Under the
public policy exception, a court may not enforce a contract that is con-
trary to public policy.' 0
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
examined the parameters of the public policy exception in Stroehmann
Bakeries v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. I I Specifically,
the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether an arbitrator's award,
reinstating an employee accused of sexual harassment without a deter-
mination on the merits, violated the public policy against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. 12 The Stroehmann Bakeries majority concluded
that reinstating such an employee did violate the public policy against
sexual harassment.' 3 The dissent asserted, however, that where an arbi-
trator's basis for reinstating an employee is lack of industrial due pro-
cess, guaranteeing procedural fairness to that employee does not violate
public policy. '14
This Note examines the conflict among the circuit courts of appeals
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988), quoted in Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 n.l (1968).
8. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 43 ("[A] court may not enforce a collective-bargain-
ing agreement that is contrary to public policy." (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local 759, International Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983))); see also St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 1155 ("[Tlhe court will not enforce
an arbitral award that either sustains or orders conduct violative of law or sub-
stantial public policy."). For a further discussion of the public policy exception,
see infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
9. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 42 (noting that public policy exception is simply
application of common-law doctrine that court cannot enforce contract that is
contrary to public policy and stating that courts have used doctrine for "occa-
sional exercises of judicial power to abrogate private agreements").
10. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1945) (applying common-law
principle that contracts are unenforceable if prohibited by statute or by public
policy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1932) (stating that
contract is unenforceable if against public policy); 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1375, at 10 (1962) ("In thousands of cases contracts
have been declared to be illegal on the ground that they are contrary to public
policy .... ").
11. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992).
12. For a discussion of the facts of Stroehniann Bakeries, see infra notes 81-
101 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Stroehmann Bakeries, see in-
fra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion ofJudge Becker's dissenting opinion in Siroehimann Bak-
eries, see infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
5
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as to when an arbitrator's award, reinstating an employee guilty of mis-
conduct, is contrary to public policy.15 As background, Section II of this
Note discusses the broad deference that courts have traditionally given
to arbitrators' decisions.16 This section also examines the public policy
exception to judicial review of arbitrators' decisions, focusing on the
public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace.17 Finally, this
section discusses industrial due process, examining the procedures that
an employer must follow in discharging an employee. 18 Section III of
this Note presents the facts of the Stroehmann Bakeries case and discusses
both the majority and dissenting opinions of the decision.' 9 Section IV
of this Note suggests that the majority, in vacating the arbitrator's
award, overstepped the boundaries of judicial review of arbitration
awards, and in doing so, minimized industrial due process concerns.
20
Finally, Section V considers the impact the Third Circuit's decision




A. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
A collective bargaining agreement between a company and a union
often gives an arbitrator the authority to settle disputes that arise be-
tween the company and the union employees. 2 2 In United Steelworkers of
15. For a discussion of the courts of appeals' differing interpretations as to
the scope of the public policy exception, see infra notes 41-53 and accompanying
text.
16. For a discussion of the deference that courts have traditionally given to
arbitration awards, see infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the public policy exception, see infra notes 30-53
and accompanying text. For a discussion of cases involving the public policy
against sexual harassment in the workplace, see infra notes 54-73 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of industrial due process requirements, see infra notes
74-80 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts of the Stroehmann Bakeries case, see infra
notes 81-101 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
opinion in Stroehmann Bakeries, see infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
For a discussion ofJudge Becker's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 115-25 and
accompanying text.
20. For a critique of the Third Circuit's opinion, see infra notes 126-137
and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit's decision in
Stroehmann Bakeries, see infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
22. See St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 1140. Unlike a commercial contract,
which is a comprehensive agreement between the parties, a collective bargaining
agreement is a skeletal document. Id. The parties to the collective bargaining
agreement generally leave gaps in the agreement for circumstances the parties
have not anticipated or have anticipated, but have not reduced to writing. Id.
The parties select an arbitrator to fill in these gaps and to resolve the issues. See
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 3-4 (providing overview of arbitration pro-
6
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America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,23 the United States Supreme
Court established the general proposition that courts have very limited
power to review arbitration awards under collective bargaining
agreements.24
In Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to invalidate an
arbitration award reinstating a group of employees who had staged a
walk-out to protest a fellow employee's discharge. 25 The Supreme
Court stated that the Fourth Circuit should have upheld the district
court's order to comply with the award. 26 In reviewing the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision, the Supreme Court stressed that allowing judicial review
of arbitrators' awards could void the parties' agreement and, therefore,
undermine the bargaining process. 2 7 Accordingly, the Court held that if
cess). Thus, bargaining is just the first stage of resolving labor disputes. Id. at 2.
The last stage is arbitration. Id.
Through the process of arbitration, parties may resolve their disputes
quickly and without judicial intervention. See, e.g., Devine v. White, 697 F.2d
421, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that arbitration is "faster, cheaper, less for-
mal, more responsive to industrial needs, and more conducive to the preserva-
tion of ongoing employment relations than litigation"); Timken Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 492 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974) (stating that arbitration is "an
expeditious and relatively inexpensive means of settling grievances and . . .it
obviates the enormous burden which would rest upon the judiciary if it should
be required to settle, case by case, the endless number of grievances and dis-
putes . . . which inevitably occur as between employers and employees");
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 2-3 ("[Arbitration] is a major factor in
achieving industrial peace .... a vital force in establishing confidence and mini-
mizing confusion at all levels of the labor management, and . . .a major con-
structive force in the collective bargaining process itself.").
23. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
24. Id. at 596-98.
25. Id. at 595. Union officials had advised the employees to return to work
immediately. Id. Enterprise management initially permitted the employees to
return to work. Id. On the following day, however, Enterprise management dis-
charged the employees. Id. The employees subsequently filed a grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement, and an arbitrator ordered Enterprise
to reinstate the discharged employees. Id. Initially, Enterprise refused to arbi-
trate. Id. The employees eventually succeeded, however, in obtaining court-
ordered arbitration. Id. After Enterprise refused to comply with the award, the
union sought judicial enforcement of the arbitrator's award, and a district court
ordered Enterprise to comply. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the collective bargaining agree-
ment had expired before the arbitration had commenced and that the arbitra-
tor's award was, therefore, invalid. Id. at 595-96.
26. Id. at 598-99.
27. Id. at 596. The Court stated that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under col-
lective bargaining agreements." Id. The Court further commented that "[t]he
federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if
courts had the final say on the merits of the awards." Id.; see Stead Motors v.
Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 1989)
(plurality opinion) (en banc) ("Deference is premised on the simple notion that
courts do not free the individual from his [or her] obligations merely because
7
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an arbitrator's award "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement, a court may not vacate the award, even if the court disagrees
with the arbitrator's award or reasoning. 28 Unfortunately, the Enterprise
Court's "essence" test is so "uniquely unquantifiable" and subjective
that it has led to differing interpretations and applications among the
circuit courts of appeals.
2 9
those obligations have turned sour on him [or her]."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946
(1990); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121,
125 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The parties bargained for the arbitrator's construction of
the contract and should be bound by it."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984);
Burke Distrib. Corp. v. Professional Salesmen's Union, Civ. A. No. 84-3246-N,
1986 WL 7230, at *3 (D. Mass. June 23, 1986) ("In short, the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement is to be accorded deference by
the Court, for it is the arbitrator's contractual interpretation, not that of the Court,
that was bargained for by the parties." (emphasis added)).
28. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598-99 (1960). The Supreme Court stated that as long as an arbitrator's
award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," a court
may not vacate an arbitrator's award even if the court disagrees with the arbitra-
tor's decision. Id. The Court further noted, however, that if the award does not
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, then courts "have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." Id. at 597.
29. Bornong, supra note 5, at 645. Professor Bornong has suggested that it
is because the "essence" test is so "uniquely unquantifiable," that the courts of
appeals have designed their own applications of the essence test. Id.; see, e.g.,
Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that arbitrator's award should be upheld if award could be "rationally
derived from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the
agreement"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Drummond Coal Co. v. UMW
Dist. 20, 748 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11 th Cir. 1984) (stating that proper analysis for
determining whether arbitrator's award should be upheld is whether arbitrator's
decision is "at least rationally inferable" from collective bargaining agreement
(quoting Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central Georgia Railyard, 415
F.2d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 1969))); Meyers v. Parex, Inc., 689 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir.
1982) (concluding that arbitrator's award "draws its essence" if there is even
"barely colorable justification" for award); Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co.,
560 F.2d 1045, 1050 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that arbitrator's award fails "es-
sence" test if it is "unfounded in reason and fact, [and] based on reasoning so
palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably have
made such a ruling, or mistakenly based on a crucial assumption of fact"); Mo-
nongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 566 F.2d 1196,
1199 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that arbitrator's award goes beyond "essence" of
agreement if arbitrator gives his or her own meaning to "plain and unambigu-
ous" language of agreement); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry.,
415 F.2d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 1969) (declaring that arbitrator's award should be
upheld if "at least rationally inferable" from collective bargaining agreement),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1976); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d
1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1960) (stating that arbitrator's award "draws its essence"
from agreement if award could "in any rational way be derived from the agree-
ment, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the
parties' intention"); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 586 (1976). Professor Gorman has
described the "essence" standard as requiring the arbitrator's decision to have
only minimal rationality. GORMAN, supra, at 586.
8
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B. Public Policy Exception
Although judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is typically very
limited, exceptional circumstances do exist in which a court may ex-
amine an arbitrator's award. 30 In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Interna-
tional Union of the United Rubber Workers,3 1 the Supreme Court established
the public policy exception as one of these exceptional circumstances.
3 2
The W.R. Grace Court held that a court may review an arbitrator's deci-
sion and vacate that decision if the decision contravenes public policy.
33
However, the Court restricted use of the public policy exception to cases
in which the public policy is "well-defined and dominant" and based in
"laws and legal precedent," rather than on public interest considera-
30. See Manville Forest Prod. v. United Paperworkers Int'l, 831 F.2d 72, 74
(5th Cir. 1987). Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is appropriate when
the award "stems from fraud or partiality; ... concerns a matter not subject to
arbitration under the contract; . . . does not 'dra[w] its essence' from the con-
tract; ... or... violates public policy." Gulf Coast Indus. Work Union v. Exxon
Co., 991 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) (quoting Manville
Forest Products v. United Paperworkers International, 831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.
1987)).
31. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
32. Id. at 766. WR. Grace involved a conflict between the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement that gave seniority to male employees and a
conciliation agreement between the employer and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) that settled a Title VII sex discrimination suit.
Id. at 759. W.R. Grace brought an action to enjoin arbitration of employee
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The district court
granted the petition of W.R. Grace, holding that the provisions of the concilia-
tion agreement with the EEOC would override any provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement that were in conflict with the conciliation agreement. Id.
Two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision and ordered W.R. Grace to arbitrate em-
ployee grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
Following the Fifth Circuit's order to arbitrate grievances under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, W.R. Grace agreed to arbitrate the grievances of two
male employees who lost their seniority because of the conciliation agreement.
Id. at 762-63. The arbitrator ultimately ordered back-pay for the two employees.
Id. W.R. Grace subsequently brought an action to vacate the award. Id. The
district court vacated the arbitrator's decision on the grounds that the award
contravened public policy, but on appeal, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's opinion. Id. at 762-63. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
W.R. Grace to consider the issue of whether a court could properly vacate an
arbitrator's award on the grounds that the award contravened public policy. Id.
at 764.
One commentator has suggested that, in using the public policy exception,
courts may second-guess the arbitrator. See Ray, smpra note 4, at 19. Professor
Ray cautions that
U]ust as arbitrators should be careful to base their findings on the col-
lective bargaining agreement and not on their own notions of justice,
courts must be careful to base public policy arguments on 'real' public
policy rather than vague and unsubstantiated notions of policy applied
because they think an arbitrator erred.
Id.
33. WR. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
9
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tions. 34 By limiting the applicability of the public policy exception, the
Court attempted to preserve limited judicial review of arbitration awards
under collective bargaining agreements.3 5 Unfortunately, the Court's
attempt was not completely successful. Following W.R. Grace, the courts
of appeals differed in their interpretations of W.R. Grace and, thus, de-
fined the scope of the public policy exception differently.
3 6
34. Id. ("Such a public policy... must be well defined and dominant, and is
to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.' " (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945))). In Muschany, the Court stated that to
determine whether a public policy existed, a court should consider statutory en-
actments, longevity of governmental practice and obvious moral or ethical stan-
dards. Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66-67. In W.R. Grace, the Court cited obedience to
judicial orders and voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as examples of public policies that would meet the public policy test and
would be appropriate for judicial review. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766-72.
35. See Harry T. Edwards,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 9
(1988). Judge Edwards, CircuitJudge for the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, commented that "[b]y formulating the excep-
tion in this manner, the Court clearly intended to limit severely the possibility of
potentially intrusive judicial review under the guise of public policy." Id. Judge
Edwards further noted that "[i]t is critical to recognize that in W.R. Grace the
Court limited its inquiry to whether the award itself violated some explicit public
policy or compelled conduct that violated such a policy." Id. at 10.
36. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 35 n.7
(1987); see also Joan Parker,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Misco and Its
Impact on the Public Policy Exception, 4 LAB. LAWYER 683, 690-91 (1988). Professor
Parker has commented that "[flollowing the issuance of the WR. Grace decision,
the federal courts had several opportunities to interpret the public policy excep-
tion, and not surprisingly there were some significant divisions among the circuit
courts as to how narrowly the public policy exception was to be applied." Id.
In interpreting IVR. Grace, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First,
Fifth and Seventh Circuits took a broad view of courts' power to review arbitra-
tion awards and expanded the boundaries of judicial review. See, e.g., United
States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825-26 (1st
Cir. 1984) (applying broad interpretation to find that arbitrator's award of rein-
statement was properly set aside because allowing postal worker guilty of em-
bezzlement to continue handling funds violated public policy against dishonest
postal workers); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food
Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying broad interpretation to find
that arbitrator's award of reinstatement was properly set aside because reinstat-
ing truck driver who had operated vehicle while under influence of alcohol con-
travened public policy against drunk driving); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that arbitration award upholding employer's rule requiring employees
to report sanitary violations to employer before reporting such violations to
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was properly set aside because
award violated public policy of health and safety); see also E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, Inc., 790 F.2d 611 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986). In DuPont, the majority stated that
"[p]recisely because this doctrine allows courts to by-pass the normal heavy def-
erence accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to 'judicialize' the arbitra-
tion process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration
award on the ground that it conflicts with public policy." Id. at 615. However,
10
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In response to the differing interpretations among the courts of ap-
the majority proceeded to suggest that the public policy of workplace safety al-
lows a court to properly review an arbitrator's decision, stating: "Assuming that
workplace safety is a valid public policy, the public policy doctrine allows this
Court to decide de novo whether the judgment made by the arbitrator ... violates
public policy." Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
Several commentators have argued that this expansive view undercuts the
finality of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Parker, supra, at 711. Parker has
suggested:
[I]f public policy is easily asserted as a basis for overturning arbi-
tration awards, the entire concept of arbitration as an efficient, fair, and
relatively inexpensive alternative to judicial litigation of grievance dis-
putes is jeopardized .... Moreover, experience has taught that in or-
der for the arbitration process to work well, there must be finality. If
contracting parties come to believe that arbitration awards may be eas-
ily overturned, they will lose respect for the process, which, in turn will
become ineffective in eliminating work stoppages and promoting stabil-
ity in the workplace.
Id.; see also Edwards, supra note 35, at 5 (stating that "offending courts [have]
seemingly fail[ed] to recognize that, in vacating awards under a broad public
policy exception, they [have] infring[ed] [on] the explicit public policy underly-
ing the duty to bargain"); Morley, supra note 7, at 632 ("A serious threat to the
viability of the arbitration system would arise if the judiciary were permitted to
exercise a liberal scope of review .... ").
On the other hand, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third,
Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits attached a narrow meaning to the
Court's language in W.R. Grace. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 808 F.2d 76, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying narrow interpre-
tation to find that arbitration board's decision to reinstate pilot charged with
flying plane under influence of alcohol was enforceable because court found"nothing in the law" prohibiting reinstatement of reformed alcoholic), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391,
1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying narrow interpretation to find that arbitrator's
award reinstating two undocumented aliens did not violate well-established pub-
lic policy and was not in "manifest disregard of the law"), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
985 (1987); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d
121, 125 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that arbitrator's award reinstating em-
ployee who was discharged for drinking during work did not conflict with state
or federal law); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654
F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying narrow interpretation to uphold arbitra-
tor's award reinstating employee who had driven bus, knowing that bus had
faulty brakes, because court found no statute "which would make it illegal to
employ bus drivers who have previously shown bad judgment"). In American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1986), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that
although embezzlement was contrary to public policy, no law or regulation pro-
hibited reinstating an embezzler. Id. at 8. The American Postal Workers court
stated:
[Ilt is well-understood that courts will not enforce an arbitration award
if the award itself violates established law . . . . However, this rule,
which is sometimes referred to as a public policy exception, is extremely
narrow .... Obviously, the exception is designed to be narrow so as to
limit potentially intrusive judicial review of arbitration awards under
the guise of "public policy."
Id.
One commentator has explained the different approaches of the circuit
courts of appeals by stating:
11
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peals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United Paperworkers Inter-
national v. Misco. 37 In Misco, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its
decision in W.R. Grace.38 The Court stated that its decision in WR.
Grace did not "sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration
awards as against public policy." '39 Moreover, the Court emphasized
that the W.R. Grace decision had ultimately "turned on... whether the
award created any explicit conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents'
rather than an assessment of 'general considerations of supposed public
Under the broad view, arbitration awards were overturned on public
policy grounds when the policy was grounded in statutory law, in com-
mon sense, and in case law. Under the limited view, however, arbitra-
tion awards were vacated on public policy grounds when the awards
were in manifest disregard of clear statutory or case law.
Tremiti, supra note 1, at 291 (footnotes omitted).
37. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In Misco, the employer discharged an employee
after finding the employee in the back seat of another employee's car and a lit
marijuana cigarette in the front seat of the car. Id. at 33. Following a hearing on
the matter, an arbitrator ordered the employer to reinstate the discharged em-
ployee. Id. The arbitrator concluded that the employer had discharged the em-
ployee before the employer had any evidence linking the discharged employee
to the marijuana. Id. The employer, seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award,
challenged the arbitrator's decision. Id. The district court vacated the arbitra-
tor's award, finding that the arbitrator's decision contravened the public policy
against operating machinery under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id. at 34-
35. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, but the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit and reinstated the arbitrator's award. Id. at 35.
The Supreme Court decided to uphold the arbitrator's award because it
found that there was no statutory or common-law basis to support the lower
court's finding. Id. at 44. The Court stated that the court of appeals "made no
attempt to review existing laws and legal precedents to demonstrate that they
establish a 'well-defined and dominant' policy against the operation of danger-
ous machinery while under the influence of drugs." Id. Furthermore, the Court
stated that even if the Fifth Circuit found a well-defined and dominant public
policy, "no violation of that policy was clearly shown." Id. The Court explained
that if:
the arbitrator found that [the employee] had possessed drugs on the
property, yet imposed discipline short of discharge because he found as
a factual matter that [the employee] could be trusted not to use them
on the job, the Court of Appeals could not upset the award because of
its own view that public policy about plant safety was threatened.
Id.
Several commentators have argued that the Court's decision in Misco is con-
sistent with the narrow interpretation of the public policy exception. See
Tremiti, supra note 1, at 280 ("The Court's narrow approach in Misco is consis-
tent with the views adopted by the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits."); see also
Edwards, supra note 35, at 15. Judge Edwards states:
Because f.R. Grace inexplicably engendered this split in the circuits the
Supreme Court received several petitions for certiorari requesting it to
put the public policy dispute to rest .... [I]n Misco, the Court, although
not settling the question once and for all, strongly suggested that the
narrow interpretation of the public policy exception is the correct one.
Edwards, supra note 35, at 15.








Despite the Court's effort to clarify the appropriate scope and appli-
cation of the public policy exception in Misco, the confusion among the
courts of appeals has continued.4 1 Specifically, the courts have split on
the issue of whether the reinstatement award itself must violate public
policy or whether the employee's underlying behavior must violate pub-
lic policy before a court may review an arbitrator's decision.4 2 The Misco
Court stressed that its decision in W.R. Grace had "turned" on whether
the arbitrator's award directly conflicted with laws and legal prece-
dents. 4 3 However, the Misco Court further stated that "[a]t the very
least, an alleged public policy must be properly framed under the ap-
proach set out in W.R. Grace, and the violation of such a policy must be
clearly shown" for a court to properly vacate an arbitrator's award.
4 4
40. Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of the
United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
41. See Parker, supra note 36, at 698-99 (stating that opinion was "purpose-
fully narrow" and "potentially confusing" and "[niot surprisingly, therefore,
within months after Misco was handed down, there were new splits among the
federal courts as to how to apply the decision"); Schaudies & Miller, supra note
1, at 155 ("The different approaches taken by federal courts interpreting Misco's
discussion of the scope of the public policy exception manifests a glaring conflict
among several circuits."). One commentator has suggested that:
Some courts have decided cases on alternative grounds to avoid the
public policy determination. Some courts have stressed that public
safety should be the major determinant of a public policy violation.
Other courts have continued to follow the narrow interpretation that
the award must violate a law, but some of these have expanded this
"narrow" interpretation by interpreting public policy broadly. Still
other courts have held that the employer failed to prove the well-de-
fined public policy, or if the employer did establish the public policy,
that the employer failed to prove the public policy was violated. Fi-
nally, some courts have balanced two conflicting public policies to de-
termine whether the award should be enforced.
Mouser, supra note 6, at 103 (footnotes omitted).
Following Misco, one commentator had optimistically suggested that the
Supreme Court's decision in Misco would resolve the conflict between the courts
of appeals. See Tremiti, supra note 1, at 294 ("[T]he Court has resolved a conflict
among the courts of appeal, and, at the same time, has adopted the limited view
of the Third, Ninth and D.C. Circuits. The Misco decision reduces the
probability that reviewing courts will overturn arbitration awards.").
42. Compare Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886
F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (plurality opinion) (en banc) (reasoning that although
underlying conduct may contravene public policy, award itself is not necessarily
contrary to public policy), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990) with Delta Air Lines v.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11 th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that if
underlying conduct contravenes public policy, then award contravenes public
policy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
43. Misco, 484 U.S. at 373. ("[O]ur decision [in V.R. Grace] turned on our
examination of whether the award created any explicit conflict with other 'laws
and legal precedents' rather than an assessment of 'general considerations of
supposed public interests.' " (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Interna-
tional Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983))).
44. Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added). The Court also noted in footnote
13
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Some circuits have narrowly interpreted Misco's formulation of the
public policy exception. 45 These courts have construed the language in
Misco to mean that a court must find that the award of reinstatement
itself contravenes public policy before a court can set aside the arbitra-
tor's award. 4 6 Thus, in Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No.
1173,47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a public policy against underlying behavior does not necessarily
make an award of reinstatement contrary to public policy. 4 8 The Ninth
Circuit stated that "[i]f a court relies on public policy to vacate an arbi-
twelve that it was not necessary for the court to "address the Union's position
that a court may refuse to enforce an award on public policy grounds only when
the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive
law." Id. at 374 n.12.
45. See, e.g., Interstate Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs, Local Union No. 135,
909 F.2d 885, 893 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that although there is public policy
against driving under influence of alcohol or drugs, reinstating employee dis-
charged for being intoxicated off-duty does not necessarily violate public policy);
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1211 n. 11 (applying narrow interpretation of public
policy exception and holding that reinstatement of mechanic who failed to prop-
erly secure lug bolts on vehicles did not violate public policy).
46. See, e.g., Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 893 (stating that courts, in deciding
whether to vacate arbitration awards, must decide "not whether [the em-
ployee's] conduct for which he [or she] was disciplined violated some public
policy or law, but rather whether the award requiring the reinstatement of [an
employee] . . . violated some explicit public policy" (citation omitted)); Stead
Motors, 886 F.2d at 1211 n. 1I ("[H]owever the public policy itself is established,
it is the arbitrator's award which must violate it if the public policy exception is to
apply."); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 379, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, No. CIV. A. 88-0472-MC, 1990 WL 67865, at *2-3 (D. Mass. May 16,
1990) (holding that "[n]ot only must the conduct be against public policy, but
the reinstatement itself must violate public policy") (citing United Paperworkers
International v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 36, 44 (1987)). Judge Edwards, Circuit
Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit, has supported a narrow interpretation
of the public policy exception following Misco. See Edwards, supra note 35, at 23,
34. Judge Edwards contends that courts should exercise deference to arbitra-
tors' decisions and should not vacate arbitration awards unless the award itself
violates a positive law found in statutes, regulations or caselaw. Id. at 33; cf.
John E. Dunsford, The Judicial Doctrine of Public Policy: Misco Reviewed, 4 LAB. LAW.
669, 676 (1988). Professor Dunsford has stated that:
Even if one is sympathetic to the limitist approach ofJudge Edwards, it
is difficult to accept his reading of IV R. Grace as restricted merely to
outright violations of law .... It is apparent the Court was thinking of
public policy in a broader sense than solely of violations of law or direc-
tions to a party to perform an action that would violate the law.
Id.
47. 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (plurality opinion) (en banc), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 946 (1990).
48. Id. at 1217. ("[Wle reject the approach of the Eleventh Circuit that,
simply because an employee has committed some act which violates a law or a
public policy in the course of his [or her] employment, his [or her] reinstatement
would also necessarily violate that public policy."). The employer in Stead Motors
discharged the employee, a mechanic, for failing to properly secure lug nuts on
customers' vehicles. Id. at 1202. The employer had previously given the em-
ployee a written warning regarding his negligence in failing to properly secure
14
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tral award reinstating an employee, it must be a policy that bars
reinstatement.' 
4 9
In contrast, other courts interpreting Misco have not required that
the award itself contravene public policy. 50 Some of these courts have
held that even if an arbitrator's award does not encourage future mis-
conduct, a court may vacate the award if the employee violated public
policy and endangered public safety in the course of his or her employ-
the lug nuts. Id. The arbitrator ordered the employee's reinstatement following
a 120-day suspension. Id. at 1203.
The employer challenged the reinstatement as contrary to public policy be-
cause it would allow the employee "to 'endanger the lives and safety of the trav-
eling public.'" Id. The court stated that "it is only if the grievant is likely to
engage in wrongful conduct which violates public policy in the future that his [or
her] reinstatement could be said to violate public policy." Id. at 1217. The
court further stated that it is the function of the arbitrator, not the court, to deter-
mine whether the employee is likely to engage in future misconduct. Id. The
court found that the reinstatement award did not contravene public policy for
two reasons: (1) there was no well-defined and dominant public policy barring
reinstatement of a negligent auto mechanic; and (2) the arbitrator found that
suspension would sufficiently discipline the employee and deter future employee
misconduct. Id. at 1216-17.
49. Id. at 1212. Furthermore, the plurality stated that:
Courts cannot determine merely that there is a "public policy" against
a particular sort of behavior in society generally and, irrespective of the
findings of the arbitrator, conclude that reinstatement of an individual
who engaged in that sort of conduct in the past would violate that pol-
icy. In our view, a faithful reading of Misco requires something more.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Mouser, supra note 6, at 119 (supporting narrow
application of Misco decision and arguing that "[e]xpansion ... would violate
arbitration's essential feature of courts deferring to arbitrators' interpretation of
the contract"). However, the dissenters in Stead Motors argued that a "broader
more rational approach grounded on analysis and informed judgment-con-
fined by 'law and precedent'-makes more sense in that it gives life to the public
policy exception rather than suffocating it beyond resuscitation." Id. at 1222
(Trott, J., dissenting).
50. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427-28, n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying broad interpre-
tation). The Iowa Electric court stated:
This Court is not required to find that the award itself is illegal
before we overrule the arbitrator on public policy grounds. The
Supreme Court in United Paperworkers declined to reach the issue of
whether such a requirement is to be read into the public policy
exception.
Id.; see also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11 th
Cir. 1989) (examining whether underlying conduct, rather than award itself, contra-
venes public policy); Mouser, supra note 6, at 113 (stating that Delta Air Lines
court "tried] to frame its decision using the language of the limitist approach,
but the rule it applie[d] [was] actually the broad public policy exception").
15
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ment. 5 1 For example, in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n,52 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that if
an employee, in the course of his or her employment, commits an act
that violates public policy, then reinstating that employee would also vi-
olate public policy.
53
C. Public Policy Against Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
Public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace is well-de-
fined and dominant, and therefore within the scope of WR. Grace.
5 4
However, very few employers have sought to vacate arbitration awards
51. See Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427-28 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that
reinstatement of nuclear power plant employee who exited through emergency
door and jeopardized reactor safety system violated public policy of "strict ad-
herence to nuclear safety rules"); Russell Memorial Hosp. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 720 F. Supp. 583, 586 n.2 (1989) (noting that "while 'limitist' view is
routinely employed in non-public safety cases, the Court declines to extend the
'limitist' view to public safety cases" (citations omitted)); Schaudies & Miller,
supra note 1, at 156 (suggesting that broader view is particularly appropriate
with regard to illegal drug use in workplace).
52. 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1989).
53. See id. at 674 (vacating arbitrator's order where federal government and
almost every state had law making it illegal to operate aircraft while intoxicated
and arbitrator's order reinstated commercial airline pilot who had flown while
intoxicated). But see Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173,
886 F.2d 1200, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (plurality opinion) (en banc), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 946 (1990). The Ninth Circuit in Stead Motors stated that:
If the performance of an illegal act while on the job is all that must be
proved to demonstrate the violation of a public policy for purposes of
Grace and Misco, then an arbitrator would be prohibited from reinstating
any teamster who receives a speeding ticket while driving the company
truck, or even an inventory clerk who commits a single act of petty
theft.
Id. at 1215.
54. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Work-
ers, Local 793, 959 F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir.) ("The public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace is 'well-recognized.' "), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304
(1992). For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in perti-
nent part, that it is unlawful:
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The Supreme Court has interpreted this pro-
vision of Title VII to include not only sexual harassment that has an economic
effect on the victim, but also sexual harassment that causes a hostile or offensive
working environment. Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986).
Title VII also provides that an employer has a legal duty to maintain a workplace
environment free from sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
In addition to Title VII, the regulations of the EEOC support the proposi-
tion that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace is well-
defined in law and legal precedent. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1992) (providing guidance as to what actions constitute
sexual harassment). The EEOC regulations impose liability on employers for
sexual harassment if the employer "knows or should have known" about the
1066
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on public policy grounds in cases involving sexual harassment. 5 5 This is
apparently because, in most cases, arbitrators uphold employers' deci-
sions to discharge sexual harassers. 56 Therefore, it is not surprising that
only three circuits have addressed the issue of whether a court may
properly vacate an arbitrator's award reinstating a known sexual har-
asser under the public policy exception.
5 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Commu-
nication Workers v. Southeastern Electric Cooperative58 was the first circuit
court to consider this issue. In Communication Workers, the arbitrator con-
cluded that the company's discharge of an employee guilty of sexual har-
assment was inappropriate. 59 Therefore, the arbitrator suspended the
misconduct and failed to take appropriate preventative steps. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1 1(d).
For a discussion of the growing problem of sexual harassment in the work-
place, see Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience v. Legal Definitions,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 46 & n.33 (1990) (noting that 1988 congressional
study of female federal employees revealed that 42% of surveyed employees had
been sexually harassed in workplace) (citing U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 2 (1988))
and Elizabeth Kolbert, Sexual Harassment at Work is Pervasive, Survey Suggests, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at Al (reporting that 40% of women participants in CBS
news poll conducted during Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings
had been sexually harassed in workplace).
55. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.) (employer sought to vacate arbitration award on grounds
that award contravened public policy), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); Chrysler
Motors 959 F.2d 685 (same); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union,
915 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1314 (1991);
Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.
1989) (same).
56. See Jonathan S. Monat & Angel Gomez, Decisional Standards Used by Arbi-
trators in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1986 LABOR L.J. 712, 715 ("Arbitrators have
routinely upheld discharge as the appropriate remedy for sexual harassment,
especially: where the course of conduct extended over time; where the sexual
harassment combined with an otherwise poor work record; or where the circum-
stances of the harassment were aggravated.") (citations omitted). But see William
A. Nowlin, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Rule, ARB. J., Dec.
1988, at 31, 35 (stating that "[a]rbitrators are quite consistent in upholding a
discharge when a grievant is found to have made unwanted physical contact with
another employee").
57. Compare Chrysler Motors, 959 F.2d at 689 (examining arbitrator's award
and upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement of employee guilty of sexual
harassment) and Communication Workers, 882 F.2d at 469 (examining arbitrator's
award and upholding award of reinstatement of employee guilty of sexual har-
assment) with Newsday, 915 F.2d at 845 (examining arbitrator's award and vacat-
ing award of reinstatement of employee guilty of sexual harassment).
58. 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 468. The employee in Communication Workers, an electric company
lineman, had sexually harassed a customer in the customer's home. Id.
Although the arbitrator found the employee guilty, the arbitrator reinstated the
employee following a one-month suspension because the employee had a
nineteen year work record with no sex-related offenses. Id. The arbitrator de-
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employee without pay.60 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the
arbitrator's award of reinstatement did not violate public policy because
the arbitrator had considered all of the evidence and had determined
that punishment short of discharge was sufficient to remedy the viola-
tion. 6 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit deferred to the arbitrator's decision and
determined that reinstating an employee guilty of sexual harassment did
not violate public policy.
62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers, 63 also
deferred to the arbitrator's choice of remedy. 64 The arbitrator in
Chysler Motors reinstated an employee guilty of sexual harassment.
6 5
Although the employee had sexually harassed fellow employees on sev-
eral previous occasions, the arbitrator considered only the single recent
incident in making his decision because Chrysler did not know about the
other incidents at the time it discharged the employee. 6 6 In upholding
the arbitrator's award, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the arbitrator's
decision, stating that although it did "not condone [the employee's] be-
havior, it was within the purview of the collective bargaining agreement
and public policy for the arbitrator to order his reinstatement.' '67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in News-
day v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 68 held that the arbitrator's
cided that suspension, rather than discharge, was the appropriate sanction be-
cause the employee was a first-time offender. Id.
60. Id. at 468-70.
61. Id. The Communication Workers court applied a narrow interpretation of
Misco. Id. at 468. The court held that the arbitrator had fully considered the
evidence and brought "his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair
solution of [the] problem." Id. at 470 (quoting United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
62. Id.
63. 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
64. Id. at 689.
65. Id. Chrysler Motors Corporation discharged the employee following al-
legations that the employee sexually harassed a female co-worker, grabbing her
breasts and stating, "Yup, they're real." Id. at 686 n.l. The employee filed a
grievance with the union, and when Chrysler Motors denied the grievance, the
matter went to arbitration. Id. at 689. The collective bargaining agreement be-
tween Chrysler Motors Corporation and the Union provided that Chrysler could
discharge employees for "just cause." Id. Furthermore, the agreement pro-
vided that the arbitrator had authority to determine the proper meaning and
application of the clause. Id.
66. Id. at 689. In considering only the single incident, the arbitrator deter-
mined that the employee could be rehabilitated. Id. Accordingly, the arbitrator
determined that a 30-day suspension without back pay would be sufficient to
deter future misconduct. Id.
67. Id. at 689. The Seventh Circuit stated that "[i]n the absence of any
explicit provision, the arbitrator is free to bring 'informed judgment .... espe-
cially ... when it comes to formulating remedies. "' Id. at 688 (quoting United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987)).
68. 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1314 (1991).
1'068 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
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reinstatement of an employee who had been found guilty of sexual har-
assment did violate public policy.69 In Newsday, the arbitrator consid-
ered the serious nature of sexual harassment, as well as the fact that the
employee had engaged in similar misconduct in the past in deciding
whether to reinstate the employee. 70 Nevertheless, the arbitrator rein-
stated the employee, concluding that discharge would be too severe a
penalty because the employer had not disciplined the employee for his
previous misconduct. 7 1 The district court in Newsday vacated the arbi-
trator's award, holding that reinstating the employee violated the public
policy against sexual harassment because it returned a known sexual
harasser to the workplace and, thereby, impeded the employer in
preventing a hostile and offensive workplace. 72 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
73
D. Industrial Due Process Requirements
Collective bargaining agreements generally do not set forth the
procedures for discharging an employee.74 Rather, most collective bar-
gaining agreements merely provide that an employer may not discharge
an employee without "just cause."'7 5 However, arbitrators have gener-
69. Id. at 845.
70. Id. at 843.
71. Id. The arbitrator decided that progressive discipline, rather than dis-
charge, would be an appropriate remedy. Id. Therefore, the arbitrator ordered
the employer to reinstate the employee without back pay. Id.
72. Id. Commenting on the public policy against sexual harassment in the
workplace, Judge Glasser, writing for the court, stated that, "[a] clearer expres-
sion of a well defined public policy .. .will not be more readily found. That
policy is subverted when an employer is required to reinstate an employee who
is a chronic sexual harasser and an award which has that effect should be va-
cated." Id. (quoting Newsday v. Long Island Typographical Union, (E.D.N.Y.)
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1314 (1991)).
73. Id. at 845. The Second Circuit noted that the arbitrator failed to take
into account the fact the arbitrator who held a hearing on the employee's previ-
ous misconduct had ruled that any future acts of sexual harassment would be
grounds for discharge. Id. In affirming the district court's decision, the court
stated that the arbitrator's decision to reinstate the employee "perpetuate[d] a
hostile, intimidating and offensive work environment," and prevented the em-
ployer from "carrying out its legal duty to eliminate sexual harassment in the
workplace." Id.
74. See Anaconda Co. v. District Lodge No. 27, 693 F.2d 35, 37 (6th Cir.
1982). The collective bargaining agreement in Anaconda required management
and supervisors to treat employees "fairly and justly." Id.; see also Federated
Dep't Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1442, 901
F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1990) (discharge provision in collective bargaining
agreement stated that employees may be discharged for "good cause"); Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 400, 621 F.
Supp. 1233, 1237 (D.D.C. 1985) (agreement provided management with right to
discipline or discharge employee for "good cause").
75. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng'g. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721
F.2d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (discharge provision in collective bargaining
19931 NOTE 1069.
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ally found procedural requirements implicit in the language of collective
bargaining agreements. 76 Accordingly, arbitrators have required em-
ployers to follow fair procedures in disciplinary actions, affording em-
ployees "industrial due process." ' 7 7 Courts of several circuits have
agreement provided that "[n]o employee may be discharged or suspended with-
out just cause"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); Chauffeurs Local Union No.
878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 716, 718 (8th Cir.) ("The Employer
shall not discharge, suspend or take other disciplinary action with respect to any
employee without just cause."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980).
76. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436, 1444 (3d Cir.) ("When arbitrators interpret collective bargaining
agreements containing broad clauses that require employers to follow fair pro-
cedure before disciplining employees, they consistently give meaning to those
clauses by applying concept called 'industrial due process.' "), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 660 (1992); Burke Distrib. Corp. v. Professional Salesman's Union, No. CIV.
A. 84-3246-N, 1986 WL 7230, at *2 (D. Mass. June 23, 1986) ("[A]rbitrators
generally interpret 'just cause' provisions as imposing basic procedural require-
ments to satisfy minimum standards of fairness."); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 27
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 512, 514 (Nov. 6, 1956) (Warns, Arb.) ("On the face of it,
'just cause' appears so vague as to give no guidance at all to the arbitrator. This
is not true, however. Over the years, the 'common law of arbitration' has de-
fined this phrase in fairly understandable terms."); Clyde W. Summers, Individ-
ual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 500
(1976) (noting that arbitrators have built body of procedural law on phrase "just
cause").
Commentators have disagreed over whether the notion of industrial due
process in arbitration is related to constitutional due process. See OWEN FAIR-
WEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION, 267-68 (Ray J.
Schoonhoven ed., 1973) (stating that "most arbitrators find that the strictures
that result from too free borrowing of due process principles from criminal law
are out of place in the 'shirt sleeves business of arbitration' "); Edgar A. Jones,
Jr., Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on Ancient Legal
Themes, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1286-90 (1966) (stating that privilege against
self-incrimination should be inapplicable in labor arbitration hearings). But see
Brunet, supra note 5, at 91-92 (stating that "labor arbitrators do not systemati-
cally ignore assertions of constitutional rights," but rather that "some measure
of civil liberties protection is present in the arbitral process by virtue of labor
arbitrators' use of their unique brand of 'due process of arbitration' " (citing
Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA, 89-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8038
(June 21, 1988) (Berkeley, Arb.) (arbitrator reversing discharge of employee
who pled guilty to charge of cocaine possession because employer failed to spec-
ify charges and because supervisor was biased by report from prison inmate who
allegedly sold cocaine to employee); Red Wing Co., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8254 (March 26, 1979) (Denson, Arb.) (arbitrator reversed employer's
decision to demote two employees based on their answers to hypothetical safety
questions, reasoning that employer did not give employees prior notice that
their answers could cause demotion); and City of Detroit, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8533 (Aug. 30, 1979) (Roumell, Arb.) (reversing suspension of prison
guard because employer decided to sanction employee before allowing em-
ployee to present his version of incidents)).
77. SeeJulius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J.
916, 921 (1979). In examining whether employers have afforded "industrial due
process" to employees, arbitrators will generally examine whether (1) the em-
ployer imposes equal punishments for similar offenses, (2) the employer gave
the employee advance notice of the company's rules and regulations, and (3) the
employer gave the employee an opportunity to explain his or her version of the
1070 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
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supported arbitrators' findings that procedural requirements are im-
plicit in collective bargaining agreements.
7 8
Thus, if an arbitrator finds that a discharged employee was not af-
forded industrial due process, the arbitrator may refuse to enforce the
employer's decision to discharge the employee. 79 Courts have given
infraction. Id. An arbitrator will find a lack of industrial due process if the em-
ployer has not met all three of these requirements. Id.; see also Federated Dep't
Stores, 901 F.2d at 1495 (arbitrator reinstating employee after finding that em-
ployer did not give employee opportunity to present his version of facts); Super
Tire, 721 F.2d at 125 (upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement based on
company's failure to give employee warning of discharge); Chauffeurs, 613 F.2d at
717 (arbitrator reinstating employee after finding employer did not give em-
ployee opportunity to present his version of facts prior to termination).
In addition, an arbitrator may determine that the employer did not afford
the employee industrial due process if key witnesses did not testify at the arbitra-
tion hearing, or if the employer failed to conduct an adequate investigation of
the alleged charges. See Ken Jennings & Roger Wolters, Discharge Cases Reconsid-
ered, 31 ARB. J. 164, 178 (1976) (discussing requirements of industrial due pro-
cess); -see also Pan Am. Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 140 B.R. 336, 339-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (arbitrator reinstated employee upon finding that employer did
not conduct adequate investigation of charges against employee); Burke, 1986
WL 7230, at *2-3 (arbitrator reinstated employee upon finding that employer
did not conduct fair and complete investigation of charges against employee).
In examining discharge cases, Professors Jennings and Wolters found that:
[t]he most commonly cited violation of due process which did occur
revolved around the investigation of the incident. More specifically, the
grievant was not permitted to explain his [or her] actions prior to the
time the decision to discharge him [or her] was made, or key witnesses
to the incident in question were not present to give first-hand testimony
at the arbitration hearing.
Jennings & Wolter, supra, at 178.
78. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, 901 F.2d at 1497 ("When interpreting a
collective bargaining agreement, the 'arbitrator's source of law is not confined to
the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the prac-
tices of the industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining
agreement although not expressed in it.' " (quoting United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1960))); Johnston Boiler Co.
v. Local Lodge 893, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 753 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that arbitrator's decision to reinstate employee on procedural grounds
was justified because "[t]he determination of procedural fairness is sufficiently
integral to 'just cause' to sustain arbitrator's decision to decide that issue");
Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756 (3d Cir.) (holding that
contract clause requiring "just cause" for discharge gives arbitrator power to
"apply all the surrounding facts and circumstances to his [or her] interpretation
of the contract to determine whether or not discharge is proper"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 828 (1982); Anaconda, 693 F.2d at 37 ("The arbitrator was not modify-
ing the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement . . . but rather was
interpreting . . . 'fairly and justly.' While this provision is very broad and gives
the arbitrator great discretion, the Company agreed to such discretion when it
signed the agreement."); Chauffeurs, 613 F.2d at 719 (stating that because "just
cause" term is ambiguous as to its procedural implications, interpretation by
arbitrator is appropriate); Burke, 1986 WL 7230, at *4 ("Case law plainly sup-
ports the arbitrator's decision that the phrase 'just cause' included elements of
procedural due process .... ").
79. See, e.g., Anaconda, 693 F.2d at 35 (arbitrator reinstating employee after
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substantial weight to due process concerns, upholding arbitrators' deci-
sions to reinstate employees because of lack of industrial due process
even where the employee was guilty of the alleged misconduct.8 0
III. STROEHMAN BAKERIES V. LOCAL 776, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS
A. Facts
On November 20, 1989, Stroehmann Bakeries dismissed one of its
delivery drivers for violating a company policy that prohibited immoral
conduct while on duty.8 ' Specifically, Stroehmann discharged the deliv-
ery driver for allegedly sexually harassing a customer's employee during
the driver's November 12, 1989 delivery.
82
Stroehmann first learned about the incident that led to the delivery
driver's dismissal on November 14, 1989.83 On that day, the manager
of one of its customer stores, Stauffer's, contacted Stroehmann's
Sales Activator and Stroehmann's Branch Manager to report that the
Stroehmann delivery driver had sexually harassed Stauffer's night
clerk.8 4 The manager told Stroehmann officials that because of the inci-
dent, he did not want the Stroehmann delivery driver to make any more
deliveries to Stauffer's. 8 5 Later that day, Stroehmann's Sales Activator
and its Branch Manager called the Stauffer's night clerk and asked her
about the incident that her manager had reported.
8 6
finding that employer did not allow employee to have union representation
when charges were presented against him); see also Leslye M. Fraser, Sexual Har-
assment in the Workplace: Conflicts Employers May Face Between Title VII's Reasonable
Woman Standard and Arbitration Principles, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 20
(stating that arbitrator may refuse, on grounds of industrial due process, to en-
force employer's decision to discharge employee and may reinstate employee or
reduce discharge to suspension).
80. See, e.g., Super Tire, 721 F.2d at 125 (upholding arbitrator's award of re-
instatement on due process grounds even though arbitrator found employee
guilty of consumption of alcohol during working hours); Safeway, 621 F. Supp. at
1239-41 (upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement on due process grounds
even though employee guilty of insubordination and threatening supervisor).
81. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
969 F.2d 1436, 1438 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992). Under
Stroehmann's written policy, "immoral conduct" is considered a major offense
and is punishable by immediate discharge. Id. at 1439.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1438. Stauffer's night clerk had told her mother that a
Stroehmann employee had sexually harassed her on the evening of November
12, 1989. Id. The night clerk's mother subsequently called Stauffer's manager
to report the incident. Id. According to the clerk's mother, the Stroehmann
driver had touched one of the night clerk's breasts without her consent and
made offensive remarks to her. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1438-39. The night clerk told the Branch Manager and the Sales
Activator that when the employee came into the store to make his delivery on
1072 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
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Following Stroehmann's discussion with the night clerk,
Stroehmann's Branch Manager contacted the delivery driver and asked
him to come to the office.8 7 The employee asked the Branch Manager if
he should bring a union representative with him to the meeting, and the
Branch Manager said that the employee could make that decision for
himself.8 8 When the Sales Activator, the Branch Manager and the em-
ployee's supervisor told the employee about the night clerk's allega-
tions, the employee denied the allegations. 89 At that meeting,
Stroehmann's Branch Manager prepared a report containing the em-
ployee's version of the incident, and the employee signed the report. 90
The written report of the meeting stated that the employee was "sus-
pended pending further investigation of the alleged incident." 9 1
Over the next few days, the Branch Manager met with his superiors
and with Stroehmann's attorney to discuss the incident.9 2 The Branch
Manager also met with the manager at Stauffer's to discuss the meeting
with the delivery driver.9 3 On November 20th, the Branch Manager dis-
charged the employee-driver for violating a company policy prohibiting
November 12, 1989, he told her that he was excited by a conversation he had
heard on his citizen's band (CB) radio about an orgy. Id. at 1439. The night
clerk claimed that the employee then tried to pull her shirt up to feel her breasts,
but that she resisted. Id. She also stated that she walked to the front of the store
to see if the other night clerk had arrived. Id. As she did so, the employee came
up behind her, reached around her and grabbed her breasts. Id. She said she
told the employee to leave, and when he left, she locked the door behind him.
Id.
At the time that Stroehmann's Sales Activator and Branch Manager spoke
with the night clerk, the clerk was "emotionally upset" and cried during the con-
versation. Id. The Sales Activator and Branch Manager prepared a written re-
port of the phone conversation with the night clerk that the night clerk signed
two months later. Id. Because the details in the night clerk's signed report dif-
fered from the details provided in the report the night clerk's mother relayed to
Stauffer officials, the exact details of the incident are unclear. Id. at 1448 n.3
(Becker, J., dissenting). According to the version the clerk told to her mother,
the Stroehmann employee harassed her after making his deliveries. Id. In the
version that the night clerk reported to the Stroehmann management, the em-
ployee harassed her immediately after entering the store. Id. The clerk also re-
lated the Stroehmann employee's comments about the CB radio conversation
and about her breast being shaped like a orange to Stroehmann management,
but she omitted these details in her first version to her mother. Id.
87. Id. at 1439.
88. Id.
89. Id. The employee denied all the allegations and stated that the night
clerk was "wacko," and he would not do anything to "jeopardize his marriage."
Id. Moreover, the employee asserted that the clerk's allegations about his CB
radio conversation were obviously untrue because his CB radio was broken. Id.
The employee asked the Sales Activator, Branch Manager and his supervisor to
look at his radio, however, they declined to do so. Id.
90. Id. The Branch Manager's report did not include any of the employee's
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immoral conduct while on duty.9 4
Following his discharge, the employee-driver filed a grievance with
Local 776 International Brotherhood of Teamsters pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement between Stroehmann and the Team-
sters.9 5 An arbitration hearing was held on March 29, 1990 to deter-
mine whether Stroehmann had just cause for discharging the employee-
driver.9 6 The arbitrator determined that Stroehmann had inadequately
investigated the night clerk's and manager's allegations before dis-
missing the delivery driver.9 7  The arbitrator concluded that
Stroehmann did not have just cause for the employee's discharge and
reinstated the employee to his former position.9 8
Following the arbitrator's decision, Stroehmann brought an action
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award.9 9 The district court
vacated the award and remanded the matter for a de novo hearing
before a different arbitrator to determine whether Stroehmann properly
94. Id. When the Branch Manager told the Stroehmann employee that he
was being discharged for immoral conduct while on duty, the employee re-
sponded that it was the night clerk who had made unreciprocated sexual ad-
vances. Id. The Stroehmann employee "accused the victim of 'talking sex' to
him and making sexual advances toward him." Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v.
Local 776 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1991),
aft'd, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992).
95. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436, 1439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992). The collective bar-
gaining agreement between Stroehmann and the Local 776 provided that
Stroehmann would "exercise the power of discipline and discharge fairly and
with regard for the reasonable rights of the employees." Id. (quoting App. at
10). The Agreement also provided that "[any employee who has been disci-
plined or discharged for any reason shall have the right to a hearing under the
grievance and arbitration provisions." Id. at 1439-40.
96. Id. at 1440.
97. Id. The arbitrator's report stated: "If Stroehmann's investigation had
been at all consistent with the severity of [the clerk's] accusations and of their
consequences for [the employee's] life and if that investigation had provided an
adequate basis to believe that [the employee] had behaved as charged,
Stroehmann's discharge decision would have been unassailable." Id. at 1448
(Becker, J., dissenting). The arbitrator also noted in his opinion that
Stroehmann based its decision on information that was "double hearsay." Id.
(Becker, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the arbitrator noted that if he had consid-
ered the credibility of the two witnesses, the night clerk and the Stroehmann
employee, Stroehmann management would "have had to lose [its challenge of
the employee's reinstatement] for having failed to bear its burden of proof." Id.
(Becker, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1440. The arbitrator ordered the employee's "reinstatement with
full back pay less interim earnings." Id.
99. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F.
Supp. 1187, 1188 (M.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 660 (1992). The Union filed a counterclaim seeking enforcement of the
award. Id. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Id. The district
court granted Stroehmann's motion and denied the Union's motion. Id.
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discharged the employee. 0 0 The Union appealed from the district
court's decision, claiming that the district court made three errors: (1)
the district court examined whether the means of determining the award,
not the award itself, contravened public policy; (2) the district court did
not give sufficient weight to the industrial due process concerns; and (3)
the district court unfairly characterized the arbitrator as insensitive to
victims of sexual harassment and biased toward the employee.',0
B. Judge Hutchinson's Majority Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit began its
determination of whether the district court had properly vacated the ar-
bitrator's award by examining when courts should apply the public pol-
icy exception. 10 2 Although the Third Circuit had not previously
considered whether the public policy exception was applicable to claims
of sexual harassment in the workplace, the court determined that
"[t]here is a well-defined and dominant public policy concerning sexual
harassment in the workplace which can be ascertained by reference to
law and legal precedent."' 0 3 Additionally, the court found that a public
100. Id. In arriving at its decision, the district court found that the arbitra-
tor: (1) focused too narrowly on the issue of whether Stroehmann afforded the
employee industrial due process; (2) failed to explain why Stroehmann's investi-
gation was deficient; and (3) did not suggest any alternative methods of investi-
gation. Id. at 1188-89. In addition, the district court found that the arbitrator's
disregard of the employee's admission that he made sexual comments about his
wife's anatomy to the clerk implied that such sexual commentary to customers
was permissible. Id. at 1189. The district court held that the arbitrator's award
"sends a message to Stroehmann employees and to the public that complaints of
sexual assault are not treated seriously, sensitively, or with real regard for the
truth of the allegations." Id. In granting summary judgment for Stroehmann,
the court noted that "[it] expresse[d] no opinion on the alleged assault or
whether [Stroehmann] reached the proper employment decision." Id. at 1190.
101. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992). Judge Scirica joined
in the majority opinion written by Judge Hutchinson. Id. at 1437. Judge Becker
filed a dissenting opinion in the case. Id. at 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the majority's opinion, see infra notes 102-14 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Judge Becker's dissent, see infra notes 115-25 and ac-
companying text.
102. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441-44.
103. Id. at 1441. The court arrived at this conclusion by examining Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and the EEOC regulations on sex-
ual harassment. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441-42. For a discussion of
the law and legal precedent concerning sexual harassment in the workplace, see
supra note 53.
Although the Third Circuit had not previously considered whether the pub-
lic policy exception against sexual harassment in the workplace was well-defined
and dominant, with a basis in law and legal precedent, the Courts of Appeals for
the Seventh, Second and Tenth Circuits had previously considered the issue. See
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d
685, 687 (7th Cir.) (concluding that "the public policy against sexual harassment
in the work place is well-defined"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); Newsday,
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policy existed with regard to "favoring voluntary employer prevention
and application of sanctions against sexual harassment in the
workplace." 1
0 4
In examining the district court's application of the public policy ex-
ception, the Third Circuit determined that an award reinstating an em-
ployee accused of sexual harassment without a finding on the merits
contravened both the public policy prohibiting sexual harassment in the
workplace and the public policy favoring employer prevention of such
harassment.' 0 5 The court examined other circuit's decisions and con-
cluded that the district court had properly vacated the arbitrator's award
on public policy grounds.
10 6
Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding that "there is an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public pol-
icy against sexual harassment in the workplace"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1314
(1991); Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467,
469 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that Tenth Circuit had recently recognized pub-
lic policy against sexual harassment in workplace in Williams v. Maremont
Corp., 875 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1989)). For a discussion of Newsday, Chrysler
Motors and Communication Workers, see supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
104. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1442. The court quoted the EEOC
regulations:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harass-
ment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, ex-
pressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, inform-
ing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all
concerned.
Id. (quoting Guidelines On Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(f) (1991)). The court stated that Stroehmann's actions in dealing
with the clerk's allegations complied with the EEOC regulations promoting the
public policy favoring employer prevention of sexual harassment in the work-
place. Id.
105. Id. The court stated that:
[the arbitrator] construed the Agreement between the parties in a man-
ner that conflicts with the well-defined and dominant public policy con-
cerning sexual harassment in the workplace and its prevention. His
award would allow a person who may have committed sexual harass-
ment to continue in the workplace without a determination of whether
sexual harassment occurred. Certainly, it does not discourage sexual
harassment. Instead, it undermines the employer's ability to fulfill its
obligation to prevent and sanction sexual harassment in the workplace.
Id.
106. Id. at 1444. The court based its decision on the rationale of the Sec-
ond, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. See id. at 1442-44. In Newsday, the Second
Circuit vacated the arbitrator's award because it returned a known sexual har-
asser to the workplace. Newsday, 915 F.2d at 845. The Stroehmann court rea-
soned that such an award "perpetuate[d] a hostile and offensive work
environment and inhibite[d] the employer from performing its duty to prevent
sexual harassment." Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1443. The Stroehmann court
further reasoned that the Tenth Circuit's holding in Communication W orkers sup-
ported its decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d
at 1443. The Tenth Circuit upheld an arbitrator's award because the arbitrator
considered the merits of the case and imposed some disciplinary measures in
1076 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
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The Third Circuit next considered the Union's claim that the dis-
trict court failed to give sufficient weight to industrial due process con-
cerns and found this claim to be "meritless."' 1 7  The court
acknowledged the importance of industrial due process and conceded
that the cases the Union offered stood "for the unobjectionable general
proposition that arbitrator's awards that reinstate discharged employees
are not subject to judicial interference if the employer did not afford the
employee industrial due process."' 0 8 The court further stated, how-
suspending the employee. Communication Workers, 882 F.2d at 469. The
Stroehmann court distinguished Communication Workers from the case before it,
noting that unlike the arbitrator in Communication Workers, the arbitrator in
Stroehmann did not consider the merits of case and failed to take any disciplinary
measures against the employee. Stroehmann, 969 F.2d at 1443. The Stroehmann
court stated that Communication Workers "does not stand for the proposition that
objectively unwelcome sexual advances can be ignored by a labor arbitrator."
Id. According to the Stroehmann court, "[tlhe Tenth Circuit merely deferred to
the arbitrator's choice of remedy." Id. Finally, in a footnote, the Stroehmann
court cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chrysler Motors as standing for the
same proposition. Id. at 1443 n.4. For a discussion of Newsday, Chrysler Motors
and Communication Workers, see supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
107. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1444. The court commented, "[wie
recognize the importance of industrial due process in the workplace and in the
day-to-day administration of the labor contracts there, but nothing the Union
has presented to us, nor that we have discovered through our own research
demonstrates that Stroehmann did not respect it." Id.
The court's reference to "our own research" is puzzling because it suggests
that the Third Circuit conducted its own factfinding of the incident in
Stroehmann. According to the Supreme Court's decision in Misco, it is impermis-
sible for a court to conduct its own factfinding. United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 45 (1987). In Misco, the Court stated that:
The parties did not bargain for the facts to be found by a court, but by
an arbitrator chosen by them who had more opportunity to observe
[the employee] and to be familiar with the [company] and its problems.
Nor does the fact that it is inquiring into a possible violation of public policy ex-
cuse a court for doing the arbitrator's task.
Id. (emphasis added). For a general discussion of industrial due process and the
procedural requirements an employer must follow to discharge an employee,
see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
108. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445. For support of this proposition,
see Federated Department Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494, 1498 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding arbitrator's
decision to reinstate employee based on employer's failure to give employee
opportunity to present his version of facts); Super Tire Engineering Co. v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1983) (deferring to
arbitrator's decision to reinstate, on due process grounds, employee found
guilty of consumption of alcohol during work hours), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984); Anaconda Co. v. District Lodge No. 27 of the International Ass'n of
Machinists, 693 F.2d 35, 37 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding arbitrator's decision to
reinstate employee on grounds that employer did not allow employee to have
union representation when charges were presented against him); Chauffeurs Lo-
cal Union No. 878 v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 716, 720-21 (8th Cir.)
(upholding arbitrator's decision to reinstate employee on grounds that em-
ployer did not give employee opportunity to present his version of facts), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. United Food Workers
Union, Local 400, 621 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-41 (D.D.C. 1985) (deferring to arbi-
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ever, that these cases were "inapposite" because Stroehmann did afford
the employee industrial due process. 10 9 The court noted that
Stroehmann confronted the employee with the allegations, allowed the
employee to respond to the charges, provided adequate notice in its
company policies that immoral conduct could result in discharge and
allowed the employee to have union representation during his meetings
with management." 0 Moreover, the court reasoned that the decision
to suspend the employee prior to confrontation was not a denial of indus-
trial due process, nor a "prejudgment." I In reviewing the district
court's decision, therefore, the Third Circuit found that the district
court had given sufficient weight to industrial due process
considerations. 121
In examining the Union's third claim of error, that the district court
improperly characterized the arbitrator as biased toward the employee
trator's decision to reinstate employee on due process grounds even though em-
ployee guilty of insubordination and threatening supervisor). For a discussion
of these cases, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
109. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445. The Union had also argued that
Stroehmann failed to afford the employee industrial due process because the
Stroehmann officials did not investigate the employee's claim that his CB radio
was broken. Id. The court dismissed this argument stating that "[tlhe broken
radio would be evidence that he had not been listening to such [erotic] conversa-
tions ... not evidence that he did not tell [the clerk] he had been doing so." Id.
For a discussion of how the dissent interpreted this evidence, see infra note 124
and accompanying text.
110. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445. In addition, all of the key wit-
nesses, including the victim testified at the arbitration hearing. Id. For a discus-
sion of industrial due process requirements, see supra notes 74-80 and
accompanying text.
111. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445. The court stated that although
Stroehmann officials had decided to suspend the employee-driver before speak-
ing to him, they had not decided to discharge the employee-driver until after
they had spoken to him twice. Id. For a discussion of the dissent's view of the
extent to which Stroehmann afforded the employee industrial due process, see
infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
Although the court determined that Stroehmann had properly followed the
procedures for discharge, Judge Hutchinson noted in a footnote that even if
Stroehmann had not met the procedural requirements, judicial review under the
public policy exception would still be appropriate. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d
at 1445 n.7. Judge Hutchinson commented:
The writer of this opinion believes this case could be decided on an
alternate ground. Even if Stroehmann did not fully afford [the em-
ployee] industrial due process, the writer believes that failure cannot
completely override all other public policy concerns. In this respect, he
would be careful to distinguish the concept of industrial due process
from due process as required by the Constitution. The writer further
believes that the Supreme Court's public policy exception . . . implies
that a labor arbitrator's concept of industrial due process does not
override a definitive public policy. Thus, he concludes that a lack of full
industrial due process, had it occurred, would not provide a reason for
reversing the district court's order ....
Id.
112. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445.
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and insensitive toward victims of sexual harassment, the court agreed
that the district court had taken some of the arbitrator's comments out
of context. t3 However, the court further noted that the district court's
decision to vacate the arbitrator's award was still proper because it was
based on public policy grounds, not on bias."
14
C. Judge Becker's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Becker, in his dissent, agreed with the majority that there is a
strong public policy against sexual harassment." t 5 He contended, how-
ever, that the majority, in its "zeal to advance that public policy ...
committed two fundamental errors that seriously undermine[d] its posi-
tion." 1 16 The first error that Judge Becker identified was the court's
misapplication of the public policy exception." 7 Judge Becker con-
113. Id. at 1446.
114. Id. (citing Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776 International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (M.D. Pa. 1991)). In deciding
whether the district court's decision to remand the matter to a different arbitra-
tor was the proper remedy, the court noted that the standard of review was
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1446 (citing Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, 807 F.2d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 1986)). The
court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding
to a new arbitrator. Id. The court decided that even if the record did not sup-
port the contention that the arbitrator was generally biased against sexual har-
assment claimants, the record did show partiality toward the employee. Id. The
court found that the arbitrator demonstrated a partiality toward the employee by
examining the arbitrator's statements and behavior at the hearing. Id. For ex-
ample, the arbitrator allowed the employee's attorney to ask the question,
"Would you think an average man or yourself would make a pass at a woman
that weighs 225 pounds?" Id. (quoting App. at 174-75). The arbitrator also
characterized the alleged victim as "unattractive and frustrated." Id. (quoting
App. at 32, 41). In addition, the court noted that the arbitrator disregarded the
employee's admission that he made sexual comments to the clerk. Id. In regard
to the comments, the arbitrator stated that the comments would not have been
"culpable under or inconsistent with Stroehmann's rules, acceptable standards
of social intercourse, or what [the clerk's] and [the employee's] bantering busi-
ness relationship had been." Id. (quoting App. at 36). In contrast, the dissent
stated that the majority's examples of bias did not exhibit partiality when put
into context. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated:
The arbitrator did allow questions about whether an "average man"
would sexually harass [the clerk]. But the arbitrator's opinion itself
suggests that such considerations were irrelevant to his decision and
that he found them offensive .... The majority further engages in mis-
characterization of the arbitrator's opinion by excerpting the phrase
"unattractive and frustrated." In fact, the arbitrator suggested that to
conclude that [the clerk] had not been sexually harassed because she
was unattractive and frustrated would be an "illogical conclusion."
Id. (Becker, J. dissenting).
115. Id. at 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated that he "ap-
plaud[ed] the court's recognition of the importance of vindicating the rights of
women in the workplace." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1450 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker claimed that the ma-
jority merely examined whether the case involved a well-defined and dominant
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ceded that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace
is well-defined and dominant, and thus within the scope of W.R.
Grace.' 18 In contrast to the majority opinion, however, Judge Becker
contended that the arbitrator's award did not contravene such public
policy.' 19 Judge Becker stated that, contrary to the majority's view, the
arbitrator did make a determination on the merits of the case, finding
insufficient evidence to support a claim of sexual harassment. 120 In ad-
dition, Judge Becker stated that even if the arbitrator had failed to make
a determination on the merits, the employee's reinstatement still would
not have violated public policy because guaranteeing procedural fair-
ness to employees is not contrary to public policy.121
public policy and did not properly consider whether the award violated public
policy. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). In contending that the majority did not go
far enough in its public policy analysisJudge Becker asserted that, "in reviewing
arbitrator's decisions, we must do more than merely ascertain that a genuine
public policy is involved. We must also determine based on facts that the arbi-
trator has found, that the award would violate public policy." Id. (Becker, J.,
dissenting). Judge Becker's interpretation of the public policy exception is simi-
lar to the Ninth Circuit's. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge
No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that reinstatement of em-
ployee who had failed to secure lug bolts on vehicle was not contrary to public
policy because there is no public policy barring reinstatement of negligent auto
mechanic), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
118. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1450 (Becker, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) ("[A] public policy against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace can be readily derived from federal statutes and regula-
tions as well as from judicial decisions .... [11f the public policy against sexual
harassment were offended by this arbitrator's decision, the award could not
stand.").
120. Id. (Becker,J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated that the arbitrator had
not refused to find whether sexual harassment occurred, but rather had consid-
ered the claim and found the evidence insufficient to support a charge. Id. at
1448 (Becker, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1450 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker stated that the ma-
jority's public policy analysis was "deeply flawed" because he could not under-
stand "how guaranteeing procedural fairness to employees accused of sexual
harassment [could] violate the public policy against sexual harassment." Id. at
1451 (Becker, J., dissenting).
After examining decisions of other circuits, Judge Becker asserted that the
majority's holding was "unprecedented." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge
Becker contended that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Communication Workers did
not support the majority's conclusion, as the majority contended, but rather
"strongly militate[d] against the majority's conclusion." Id. (Becker, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Communication Workers v. Southeastern Electric Cooperative, 882
F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989)). Judge Becker pointed out that the award at issue in
Stroehmann was less likely to contravene public policy than the award in Communi-
cation Workers because the Stroehmann award would return an accused sexual har-
asser, rather than a known sexual harasser, to the workplace. Id. (Becker, J.,
dissenting). In addition, Judge Becker cited the Seventh Circuit's recent deci-
sion in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, in support of the proposition that reinstatement of an known sexual
harasser does not violate the public policy against sexual harassment in the
workplace. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Interna-
1080 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
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On the issue of lack of industrial due process, the second error that
Judge Becker identified in the majority's opinion, Judge Becker stated
that Stroehmann did not meet the collective bargaining agreement's
procedural requirements.122 Judge Becker noted that the agreement re-
quired Stroehmann's "higher management" to conduct an investigation
and required Stroehmann to carry the burden of proving that the al-
leged conduct actually occurred.' 23 In finding that Stroehmann did not
meet either of these requirements, Judge Becker stated that the arbitra-
tor's reinstatement of the employee was proper. 124 Further, Judge
Becker commented that courts should subject arbitrators' awards that
reinstate employees on the basis of lack of industrial due process to an
"exceedingly narrow scope ofjudicial review.' 125
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Stroehmann Bakeries broadly interpreted the public
policy exception in an effort to promote the public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace. 126 However, the majority, in its "zeal" to
tional Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992)).
122. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1452 (Becker, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Becker,J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Becker,J., dissenting). In concluding that the employee was "enti-
tled to a thorough investigation of the charges against him by high-level man-
agement which he never received," Judge Becker stated that "Stroehmann's
egregious failure to provide [the employee] with the procedural protections
guaranteed by the collective bargaining agreement justifie[d] his reinstatement."
Id. at 1452, 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker further stated that even
if Stroehmann had conducted a sufficient investigation, the arbitrator's rein-
statement award would still be proper because Stroehmann "did not carry its
burden at the arbitration of showing that [the employee] was discharged for just
cause." Id. at 1452 (Becker, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Becker considered
Stroehmann officials' failure to examine the employee's CB radio another failure
of industrial due process, particularly because it was "the most significant (and
perhaps the only) objective evidence in the case." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker determined that a
reinstatement award based on employer's failure to demonstrate just cause for
dismissal was not unusual, it was "run of the mill." Id. (Becker,J. dissenting). In
addition,Judge Becker commented in a footnote that while he did not agree that
courts should have such an "exceedingly narrow" review of arbitral awards, pre-
cedent controlled his decision. Id. at 1447 & n.l (Becker, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). The public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace is well-defined and dominant, as is the public policy
favoring voluntary employer prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (holding that
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses not only sexual discrimination
in hiring practices but also sexual harassment that has economic effect on com-
plainant or that creates hostile and offensive work environment); Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1992) (providing guidelines
for determining what actions constitute sexual harassment). Although this pub-
lic policy is well-established, some courts of appeals have found that reinstate-
ment of an employee guilty of sexual harassment is not contrary to public policy.
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advance public policy, arguably added more confusion to the already
problematic public policy exception, overstepped the boundaries of ju-
dicial review and minimized industrial due process concerns.
First, in broadly interpreting the public policy exception, the major-
ity expanded the exception. In Stroehmann Bakeries, the arbitrator alleg-
edly failed to make findings on the merits because he decided that
Stroehmann did not afford the employee industrial due process.' 2 7 By
vacating this award on public policy grounds, the majority essentially
implied that guaranteeing procedural fairness to employees can be con-
trary to public policy.1 2 8 Moreover, by basing its decision on public pol-
icy grounds, the majority arguably broadened the scope of the public
policy exception to include awards that reinstate accused sexual
harassers. 129
In addition to expanding the scope of the public policy exception,
the majority also overstepped the boundaries of judicial review by sec-
ond-guessing the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement and the arbitrator's fact-finding. In reviewing the issue of
industrial due process, the majority conceded that the cases the Union
See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959
F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir.) (holding that reinstatement of employee found guilty of
sexual harassment was not contrary to public policy), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304
(1992); Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467,
469 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement of employee
found guilty of sexual harassment). But see Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typo-
graphical Union No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating arbitrator's
award because it returned known sexual harasser to workplace), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 922 (1991).
127. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1438. The majority found that the ar-
bitrator's award contravened public policy because the arbitrator did not make a
determination on the merits. Id. The arbitrator interpretated the collective bar-
gaining agreement to mean that if the employer dismisses an employee without
just cause, the arbitrator may reinstate the employee on that basis, regardless of
whether the employee was guilty of the underlying misconduct. Id.
128. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1436; cf Pan Am. Corp. v. Air Line
Pilot Ass'n, 140 B.R. 336, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding arbitrator did not
exceed authority in ordering reinstatement of employee for lack of industrial
due process without making findings on merits); Nowlin, supra note 56, at 40
(stating that "[t]o have discipline sustained for sexual harassment, it must be
clear that the grievant knew or should have known of the rules; there must have
been an investigation, even if the grievant was previously warned; and there
must have been testimony from the victim").
129. See Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1451 (BeckerJ., dissenting). Judge
Becker, in his dissent, posited that the majority's public policy analysis was
deeply flawed for this reason. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker also
stated that the majority's application of the public policy exception places the
burden on proof on the employee to prove that the sexual harassment did not
occur. Id. at 1447 (Becker, J., dissenting). Such shifting of the burden of proof,
Judge Becker stated, "would directly contravene the just cause clause for which
the parties have bargained." Id. at 1451 (Becker, J., dissenting); see also Fraser,
supra note 79, at 39 (stating that majority's holding in Stroehmann "improperly
places the burden of proof on the accused to show that he did not sexually harass
the complainant").
1082 [Vol. 38: p. 1051
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/4
cited did support the general proposition that judicial review of arbitra-
tor's awards is improper if the employer failed to afford the employee
industrial due process.' 3 0 However, the majority found that these cases
were not relevant because "Stroehmann did not reach its decision to
discharge [the employee) without respecting industrial due process."131
While the majority's conclusion that Stroehmann afforded the employee
industrial due process is correct, such a determination is for the arbitra-
tor, not the court.1 3 2 Even if the arbitrator in Stroehmann Bakeries was
wrong in construing the scope of the "high-level management investiga-
tion," under Misco, the court still owes deference to the arbitrator's find-
ing that Stroehmann did not afford the employee industrial due
process.' 3 3 The industrial due process cases, therefore, are not inappo-
130. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445. The majority in Stroehmann Bak-
eries stated that:
[t]he cases the Union cited for the court at oral argument stand for the
unobjectionable general proposition that arbitrators' awards that reinstate
discharged employees are not subject to judicial interference if the em-
ployer did not afford the employee industrial due process.
Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. The majority emphasized that Stroehmann confronted the em-
ployee with the allegations against him, afforded him an opportunity to present
his version of the alleged incident, allowed him to have union representation at
his meeting with the management and presented all of the key witnesses at the
arbitration hearing. Id. For a general discussion of the requirements of indus-
trial due process, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
132. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38
(1987). The Supreme Court stated in Misco:
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbi-
trator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view
of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to
accept .... To resolve disputes about the application of a collective
bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not
reject those facts simply because it disagrees with them. The same is
true of the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract.
Id.
The Stroehmann majority stated that nothing in its finding suggested that
Stroehmann denied the employee his industrial due process rights. Stroehmann
Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1444. Such a determination is for the arbitrator, not the
court, however, because the parties to a collective bargaining agreement author-
ize the arbitrator to conduct fact-finding and to interpret the contract. See
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 5.
133. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 (stating that court owes deference to arbitra-
tor even when arbitrator is arguably wrong in construing the collective bargain-
ing agreement); see also United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "[c]ourts are prohibited
from second-guessing the arbitrator's fact-finding and contract interpretation 'as
long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract within
the scope of his [or her] authority' rather than simply applying his [or her] own
branf of industrial justice" (quoting United Paperworkers International Union v.
Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987))). Following Misco, in United States Postal Ser-
vice, the Third Circuit identified three circumstances in which judicial review of
an arbitration award would be inappropriate. United States Postal Service, 839 F.2d
at 148. The Third Circuit identified the following grounds as inappropriate ba-
ses for judicial review of an arbitration award:
1993] NOTE 1083
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site as the majority suggests, because the decision was properly that of
the arbitrator, not the court.
134
Finally, in suggesting that even if Stroehmann failed to fully afford
the employee full industrial due process, public policy concerns would
override procedural concerns and permit a court to vacate the award,'
35
Judge Hutchinson minimized industrial due process concerns.
Although Judge Hutchinson cited the Supreme Court's decision in Misco
as support for this proposition,' 3 6 nothing in the Court's decision in
Misco supports Judge Hutchinson's conclusion. Instead, Misco would ap-
pear to support the proposition that unless the parties prohibited the
(1) asserting a public policy without substantiating its existence within
existing laws and legal precedents, and thereby failing to distinguish its
pedigree as a "well-defined and dominant" public policy as opposed to
a "general consideration of supposed public interests;" (2) second-
guessing the arbitrator's fact-finding particularly inosfar as the conclu-
sion that the asserted public policy would be violated by the employee's
reinstatement depends on drawing factual inferences not made by the
arbitrator and; (3) second-guessing the arbitrator's reasonable con-
struction of the "just cause" clause, and the rules of evidence and pro-
cedure appropriate to a "just cause" determination under the collective
bargaining agreement.
Id. In Stroehmann Bakeries, the Third Circuit seemingly ignored its own language
and exceeded its reviewing authority in second-guessing the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
134. For a discussion of the majority's analysis of industrial due process
concerns, see supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
135. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445 n.7. Under Judge Hutchinson's
formulation, a court may vacate an arbitrator's award on the grounds that the
arbitrator's failure to make findings on the merits violates public policy. See
Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1444-45 & n.7. But see Pan Am. Corp. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 140 B.R. 336, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding arbitrator did not
exceed authority in ordering reinstatement of employee for lack of industrial
due process without making determination on merits).
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Hutchinson stated that he "would be
careful to distinguish the concept of industrial due process from due process as
required by the Constitution." Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445 n.7. Judge
Hutchinson does not, however, give a reason for distinguishing between the two
concepts. By upholding reinstatement awards on procedural grounds even
where the employee was guilty of the underlying conduct, courts have estab-
lished a body of law that can be analogized to the constitutional due process case
law. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1983) (upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement on due
process grounds even though arbitrator found employee guilty of consumption
of alcohol during working hours); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union, Local 400, 621 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-41 (D.D.C. 1985)
(upholding arbitrator's award of reinstatement even though employee guilty of
insubordination and threatening supervisor). For a discussion of Super Tire and
Safeway, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
136. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1445 n.7 (citing United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-40 (1987)). Judge Hutchin-
son stated in Stroehmann Bakeries that "the Supreme Court's public policy excep-
tion to the general rule against court review of the merits of a labor arbitration
decision implies that a labor arbitrator's concept of industrial due process does
not override a definitive public policy." Id.
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arbitrator from dismissing claims for failure to afford the employee full
industrial due process, the arbitrator should be free to base his or her
decision on procedural issues.
13 7
V. CONCLUSION
Although the ultimate result in Stroehmann Bakeries is not troubling
because Stroehmann did appear to have afforded the employee ade-
quate industrial due process, the implications of the Third Circuit's
holding are troubling.' 3 8 While the Third Circuit's decision takes a
commendable step toward promoting the public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace, it simultaneously threatens the finality of
arbitration awards.' 3 9 Soon other courts may begin conducting their
137. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 39. In considering the propriety of vacating the
arbitrator's award in Misco, the Court stated that "it was not open to the Court of
Appeals to refuse to enforce the award because the arbitrator, in deciding
whether there was just cause to discharge, refused to consider evidence un-
known to the Company at the time the [employee] was fired." Id. The Court
further stated that "[tihe parties bargained for arbitration to settle disputes and
were free to set the procedural rules for arbitrators if they chose." Id.
138. See Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1451 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge
Becker stated in his dissent that the majority could have overturned the arbitra-
tor's award on other grounds. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge
Becker noted that "[i]f the majority believes this case to be unique because the
arbitrator was biased, then the case alone can be resolved on the basis of his bias
alone without reference to public policy." Id. at 1451 (Becker, J., dissenting)
(citing United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 40-
41 & n.10 (1987)). Third Circuit precedent also supports the proposition that
arbitrator's awards can be set aside on the basis of arbitrator bias. See Arco-
Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8074, 671 F.2d 752, 754 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that
"[a]n award may be vacated where it is shown that there was ... partiality... on
the part of the arbitrator" (citing Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher,
405 F.2d 1123, 1128-29 n.27 (3d Cir. 1969))). Although the Stroehmann Bakeries
majority disagreed with the district court's finding that the arbitrator was biased
against sexual harassment claimants generally, the majority stated that the arbi-
trator's "partiality in this case [was] demonstrated by his behavior and com-
ments during the hearing." Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1446. As a result,
the majority could have followed Judge Becker's suggestion and vacated the
award on the grounds of partiality, remanded the matter to a new arbtirator and
avoided the complications of the invoking the public policy exception. See id. at
1451 (Becker, J., dissenting).
One commentator has suggested that the majority could have also reached
the same result by vacating the majority's decision on the ground that the arbi-
trator dispensed "his own brand of industrial justice." See Fraser, supra note 79,
at 40 (suggesting that based on evidence that arbitrator characterized victim as
"unattractive and frustrated," Third Circuit could have concluded that arbitra-
tor was applying his own standards of right and wrong and vacated award on
that ground).
139. See Mouser, supra note 6, at 95. Mouser has stated that:
The federal legislative policy of encouraging arbitration to resolve la-
bor disputes would be undermined if federal courts were free to rede-
termine the facts of disputes and the merits of awards .... If a court
could redetermine the merits, the party who lost the arbitration award
would view the arbitrator's determination as having little decisive effect
35
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own factfinding and applying their own notions of industrial due pro-
cess. Moreover, as a result ofJudge Hutchinson's suggestion that public
policy outweighs industrial due process, the importance of protecting




and the party who won the arbitration would not be able to rely on the
arbitrator's decision.
Id.
140. See Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1451 (Becker, J., dissenting). If an
employer discharges an employee guilty of sexual harassment, that employee
generally may seek to recover damages from their former employers. See Grace
M. Kang, Laws Covering Sex Harassment and Wrongful Dismissal Collide, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 1992, at BI, BIO (noting that increasing number of employees who
have lost their jobs following sexual harassment charges are bringing wrongful
discharge claims against their former employers). Following the Third Circuit's
decision in Stroehmann Bakeries, however, it may be more difficult for an employee
to bring a wrongful discharge claim against his or her former employer. See Fra-
ser, supra note 79, at 39 (stating that Third Circuit's decision in Stroehmann Baker-
ies "allows an employer to inadequately investigate a complaint of harassment,
terminate the alleged harasser to limit the employer's liability, and then be held
unaccountable to the alleged harasser").
Subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision in Stroehmann Bakeries, at least
one court has examined the issue of whether public policy concerns override
industrial due process concerns and concluded that reinstating an employee
without making findings of fact did not violate public policy. See Pan Am. Corp.
v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n, 140 B.R. 336, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In In re Pan Ameri-
can v. Air Line Pilots Association, Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) dis-
charged an airline pilot because of allegations that the pilot allowed a flight
attendant to take charge of the plane's controls. Id. at 337. Upon finding that
Pan Am had not conducted a full and fair investigation of the allegations, the
arbitration board reinstated the pilot on due process grounds without making
any findings on the merits of the claim. Id. at 338. In challenging the arbitra-
tor's award, Pan Am contended that the arbitrator's decision to reinstate the
employee without making findings of fact contravened the well-established pub-
lic policy favoring airline safety. Id. at 341. The court rejected Pan Am's argu-
ment, holding that the arbitrator's decision to reinstate the employee, without
making findings of fact, did not violate public policy. Id. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court stated that "the risk that an arbitration award may violate
some explicit public policy is not an 'excuse' for courts to perform the work of
arbitrators." Id. Until the Supreme Court provides guidance in this area, em-
ployers can try to protect themeselves from liability by limiting an arbitrator's
authority. See id at 341 n.3 (noting that arbitrator only has authority in "absence
of an explicit provision" and therefore, "had Appellant been particularly con-
cerned about the public policy ... , it could have created an exception to the
arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement, for example, for-
bidding the arbitration of grievances involving airline safety"); see also ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 413 (stating that parties may amend collective bargain-
ing agreements to restrict arbitrator from hearing future cases); FAIRWEATHER,
supra note 76, at 33 (stating that if parties exclude sexual harassment cases from
arbitration, then employer can dismiss sexual harasser without having arbitrator
hear claim).
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